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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS BILL
EDWINM. BORCHARD*
ORTY years ago, Ernst Freund, in an article which is still funda-
mental to the subject, stated:
A tort committed in the exercise of governmental functions creates no private
cause of action against the state; where a liability is demanded by justice, it must be
created by statute.
A tort committed in connection with private relations should give rise to a corre-
sponding civil liability, with such statutory exceptions as may be dictated by public
policy. This is not the recognized law, but seems to be demanded on general principles.,
After nearly ten years of effort, the Committees on Claims of the two
houses of Congress, with the co-operation of the law officers of the several
executive departments, finally have worked out a bill2 which, if passed,
will carry into effect the principles of a just and sound public policy ad-
vocated by Ernst Freund in 1893. In the light of this revolutionary, al-
though long over-due, development, which probably only budgetary con-
siderations of the moment can deter from early enactment into law, it
* Professor of Law, Yale University Law School.
Private Claims Against the State, 8 Pol. Sci. Q. 625, at 652 (1893).
2 The Howell-Collins bill of the 72d Cong., ist sess., S. 4567, Calendar No. 697, Senate Re-
port 658. The bill is largely to be credited to the efforts of Representative Underhill of Massa-
chusetts beginning in 1924, and of Senators Bayard of Delaware and the late Senator Howell
of Nebraska, who was chairman of the Senate Committee on Claims during the later years of
the bill's career. Great credit is also due to Mr. Alexander Holtzoff of New York, Special As-
sistant to the Attorney General, who was assigned by Attorney General Mitchell to the special
task of co-ordinating the views of the Government departments and whose detailed criticisms
of the bill helped greatly in the formulation of the latest, and possibly, final draft. Much credit
is also due to Mr. 0. R. McGuire, Counsel of the General Accounting Office of the Comptroller
General.
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may be appropriate to signalize the event as something of a memorial to
the farsighted sagacity and the public services of Ernst Freund.
It can readily be appreciated that, in working out the polidy of estab-
lishing new legal relations between private individuals and the Federal
Government and of fixing the details of the procedure to give them effect,
an infinite number of considerations had to be taken into account. The
Howell-Collins bill, which will probably not be greatly changed,3 is the
culmination of long efforts and many drafts of bills, one of which actually
passed both House of Representatives and Senate in 1929,4 only to be
given a pocket veto by President Coolidge, presumably because of the
Attorney General's objection to that provision of the bill, as then drafted,
enabling the Comptroller General first to "settle" and determine the valid-
ity of the claim and then to appear in the Court of Claims on certiorari
proceeding to defend the settlement he had approved. Inasmuch as the
Attorney General had customarily been the only legal official to defend the
United States in the Court of Claims, this innovation was considered ob-
jectionable by him.5 Perhaps the failure of the bill is not to be too greatly
regretted, for the Howell-Collins bill now under consideration is in some
respects a great improvement upon it.
Briefly, the Howell-Collins bill provides for the "allowance and pay-
ment of claims" for damage to private property up to $50,000 caused by
the "negligence6 of any officer or employee of the Government within the
scope of his office or employment, and not out of contract." In the case of
personal injuries or injury resulting in death, a limit of liability of $75oo is
provided for. The procedure for asserting the claim is by notice to the
3 It will be reintroduced in the 73d Congress by Senator Bailey, Chairman of the Claims
Committee of the Senate.
4 On March 2, 1929, after a Conference Report. H. R. 9285, 7oth Cong., 2d sess.; Senate
4377, 7oth Cong., 2d sess.;. Senate Report i699, 7oth Cong., 2d sess.
s The Attorney General's objection of February, 1929, was embodied in a letter addressed
to Senator Deneen of Illinois, in charge of the bill. It was drafted by Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Galloway, then in charge of Court of Claims cases. Its substance will be found in the arti-
cle of Mr. 0. R. McGuire, Tort Claims Against the United States, ig Geo. L. Jour. 133, at
134, note 7 (Jan. 1931).
6 The bill of 1929, as passed by House and Senate, and even the original Howell bill of 1932,
had contained the words, in successive bills ever since 1925, "negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion." Negligence is not usually wilful, so that the most recent draft may be said to narrow
the scope of substantive liability assumed. Other exceptions and limitations will be adverted
to hereafter.
The English Crown Proceedings bill, 1927, Command 2842, which may soon be enacted,
reads (section ii): "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Crown shall be liable for any
wrongful act done, or any neglect or default committed, by an officer of the Crown in the same
manner and to the same extent as that in and to which a principal, being a private person, is
liable for any wrongful act done, or any neglect or default committed, by his agent .......
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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS BILL
Comptroller General within 3o days of the "occurrence of the event" out of
which the claim arose, to be extended to 90 days if the claimant can show
reasonable cause for delay and can prove that the United States has not
been prejudiced thereby; but this must be followed within a year by a
formal claim under oath.' The General Accounting Office, after sub-
poenaing witnesses, if necessary, and on such evidence as the claim-
ant and the Government Department involved may supply, is then
authorized to "settle and adjust" the claim. If the claim is under
$iooo, and provided the claimant assents, the Comptroller General can
pay the claim out of the appropriation of the Department or independent
establishment in question, if the head of the Department approves. Set-
tlements above $iooo must be certified to Congress for congressional ac-
tion. If the claimant is dissatisfied, he can file an original suit-not by
certiorari, as the 1929 bill provided-in the Court of Claims, within one
year of the unaccepted decision of the Comptroller General or, if a deci-
sion is delayed, six months after the claim has been filed. The judgments
of the Court of Claims are final, as usual, except for the possibility of re-
view on certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.
Fourteen types of tort claims are excepted from the bill, including
claims arising out of the loss or miscarriage of mail matter, out of the as-
sessment or collection of taxes, out of losses of property of persons in the
military or naval service, out of the merchant marine and Navy suits in
admiralty Acts of 192o and 1925, respectively, out of acts of the Alien
Property Custodian, out of the administration of the quarantine laws-
now without exception of the laws administered by the Public Health
Service, as in the 1929 bill-out of flood control and river and harbor and
irrigation activities, out of injuries to vessels and cargo passing through
the Panama Canal, out of the acts of military and naval forces where re-
lief is otherwise provided, out of injury to or death of a prisoner, out of
alleged negligence of physicians or employees of a "Government hospital,
dispensary, or institution,"'7 a out of injuries or death arising from assault
and battery, false arrest or imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, interference with contract rights, or
any criminal act, or-a provision not found in the 1929 bill-out of the
alleged effect of an Act of Congress, or executive order of the President,
or of any department or independent establishment.
In section 303 of the bill, providing for a formal claim, the original words "negligent or
wrongful acts or omissions" are retained. It is submitted that they should be restored to sec-
tion i.
7a The term "institution" seems exceptionally broad.
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This represents a considerable limitation of substantive liability, and is
doubtless induced by the effort to confine the new policy within a narrow
range, dictated by caution. As experience in the administration of the
Act develops, it may be found advisable to extend its provisions, for it
must be remembered that tort claims not brought within the Act are di-
rected, as of old, to committees of Congress.
The Federal Government has, to a limited extent, opened the door to
suit or claim against itself, at first in contract cases, and, since 1922, in prop-
erty tort cases up to $iooo, relief in these latter cases being administrative
only. Although the Constitution provides that "private property" shall
not "be taken for public use without just compensation," there was until
1855 no judicial means of making the requirement effective. Claimants
were compelled to petition Congress to redress their grievances. The de-
fects of this system, both for the claimant and for the members of Con-
gress, led to the establishment of the Court of Claims, with jurisdiction in
claims founded upon a "law of Congress or upon any regulations of an
Executive Department, or upon any contract, express or implied." To
this theie were added, by the Tucker Act of 1887, claims founded "upon
the Constitution of the United States," a clause which has been construed
into comparative meaninglessness, and claims "for damages, liquidated or
unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort."
These jurisdictional clauses have been construed most strictly against
the claimant. The owner of property taken by Government officers for
public use must prove that it was "taken" under an express or implied
promise to pay for it. And a promise to pay will not easily be "implied."
Impressed by the inhibition against claims "sounding in tort" and by the
traditional view that the Government's consent to be sued is to be con-
strued as narrowiy as possible, the Supreme Court has given an exceed-
ingly technical construction to the terms "taking" and "implied contract"
and a very wide interpretation to the clause "sounding in tort."8 Thus, the
physical act of "taking" must so greatly interfere with the private use
that the injury and deprivation are permanent and substantial, and not
merely temporary or consequential, and, therefore, tortious. There must
be an intent to take. Thus, a denial or questioning of the owner's right to
the property-except in patent cases under statute--by the Government's
assertion of an adverse claim or the denial of an intent to pay, will defeat
recovery, for the taking is then tortious. The more flagrant and unjusti-
fiable the Government's acts, the less becomes its liability-hardly a com-
mendable principle of law. Moreover, the circumstances must not nega-
8 34 Yale L. Jour. 28, 3o et seq.
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tive the owner's open or tacit acquiescence, otherwise the plaintiff will
defeat that consensual relation which is supposed to underlie the implied
contract-implied in fact, rather than in law.9 Mere evidence of Govern-
mental enrichment is insufficient to raise the implication of contract; a
quasi-contractual obligation will not be recognized, unless, as in tort cases,
covered by a special Act of Congress ad hoc conferring jurisdiction. Such
Acts have occasionally been passed. There are many other legal hurdles
placed by judicial construction in the way of claimants. Unless a claimant
is fortunate enough to be able to climb them all, he is likely to find his
claim dismissed as "sounding in tort."
In recent years the force of circumstances has induced a growing dis-
position on the part of Congress to authorize suit in tort against the United
States or to provide administrative machinery for the determination of
legal responsibility under customary rules of law. In i9io suits for patent
infringement were permitted."- Since 9oo, special statutes have been
passed with increasing frequency, either appropriating funds, after com-
mittee investigation, to compensate for tort injuries of various kinds or
else referring such claims to the Court of Claims or United States District
Courts for determination and judgment. A Federal "Employers' Liabil-
ity Act" has been passed, establishing an Employees' Compensation Com-
mission to provide compensation for disability or death of an employee
"resulting from a personal injury sustained while in the performance of
duty."" In taking over the railroads and certain collateral services during
the war, with the curious exception of the telegraph system, 2 and in estab-
lishing a Shipping Board for the operation of merchant ships, the Govern-
ment placed itself, in respect of legal responsibility, in the position of a
private operator. 3 On March 3, 1925, a comprehensive Suits in Admiralty
Act was passed, 4 authorizing suits against the United States in the Federal
District Courts for damage caused by and salvage service rendered to
public vessels of the United States, thus materially extending the scope
of the Act of March 9, 192o, relating to publicly-owned merchant vessels.
In the operation of its war ships and public vessels, the United States thus
9 Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 385 (1923); same parties, 261 U.S. 592
(1923), under Dent Act; Jacob Reed's Sons v. United States, 273 U.S. 200 (1927), aff'g. 6o Ct.
Cl. 97 (1925).
Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 85i.
Act of Sept. 7, 1916, c. 458, 39 Stat. 742.
1" Western Union Tel. Co. v. Poston, 256 U.S. 662 (1921).
" Act of March 21, 1918 (R. R.); Act of Sept. 7, 1916, § 9, 39 Stat. 728; Act of March 9,
X920, 41 Stat. 525.
1443 Stat. II 2.
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waived its sovereign immunity from suit and responsibility, retaining
merely those privileges as to limitation of liability possessed by ship own-
ers and operators generally. This step marked an epoch in American pub-
lic law.
Congress has also passed a number of statutes, mainly since the war, con-
ferring a limited administrative jurisdiction on the heads of the various Ex-
ecutive Departments to settle claims for tort injuries arising in their respec-
tive Departments. Even prior to the general Act of December 28,1922, con-
ferring power on the head of each Executive Department and independent
establishment to settle claims for "damage to or loss of privately-owned
property" not exceeding $iooo, "caused by the negligence of any officer
or employee of the Government acting within the scope of his employ-
ment," -5 numerous Acts had been passed conferring on the heads of cer-
tain Departments, mainly War, Navy, and Post Office, a limited power to
settle tort claims. 6 Some of the provisions of these Acts, renewed in an-
nual deficiency appropriations, or otherwise, extend the scope of the Act
of December 28, 1922, to personal injuries and/or dispense with proof of
negligence.
The partial and limited relief thus afforded to claimants in certain tort
cases is a recognition of the validity of the principle. By the pending bill,
it is now admitted that tort claims in excess of $iooo are equally entitled
to consideration. Unable to present them to the Executive Departments
or the Courts, the claimants have pressed these claims upon the Govern-
ment through a bill in Congress-a political, and not a legal, channel.
The history of claims against the United States presents a picture of the
gradual transfer of claims by Congress from the political to legal channels
-first in contract cases, then in small tort and special types of tort claims,
like patent and admiralty. Now comes a general tort bill.
It may be of interest to trace the evolution of some of the major fea-
tures of the pending bill. As the tort claims bill first passed the House,
without a dissenting vote, on June io, 1926,'1 a limitation of liability to
$3ooo, introduced by the Senate, was removed, and liability in property
cases was left unlimited. This seemed too broad for an experimental pol-
icy, so that subsequent bills have limited the jurisdiction to claims not ex-
s Act of Dec. 28, 1922, C. 17, 42 Stat. io66.
16 See for example Act of Oct. 6, i917, 40 Stat. 389; Act of March 29, 1918, 40 Stat.
499; Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 586; Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 364; Act of Mar. 4,
1921, 41 Stat. 1436; Act of June 16, 1921, 42 Stat. 63; Act of June 7, 1924, c. 291, 43
Stat. 483 and Pub. No. 413, pp. 6-7, 68th Cong.; Veterans' Act of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat.
607; Act of May 28, 1924, 43 Stat. 199; Act of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 492.
17 Sen. 1912, 69th Cong.
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ceeding $5o,ooo. Claims in excess of $5o,ooo will have to be advanced
through political channels, as heretofore, although it is possible that the
passage of the Tort Claims Act will persuade Congress more readily to
refer such claims to the Court of Claims. In personal injury cases, the bills
always carried a limitation, first of $io,ooo, now reduced to $7500. Fear
of exaggerated claims accounts for these limitations. If experience justi-
fies the new policy, it is possible that the jurisdictional amount will be
raised.
Influenced by the example of the Small Claims Act of 1922, which gave
the heads of Executive Departments power to settle property claims (sub-
ject to congressional approval by appropriation) up to $iooo, the early tort
bills of 1925-1928 had sought to leave small claims in the executive channel,
and make only larger claims the subject of judicial action. At one time the
executive jurisdiction was limited to $2000, claims beyond that to go to
the District Courts and Court of Claims. Fearful of overburdening the
courts, the administrative jurisdiction was later raised to $5ooo. Inas-
much as most claims would involve less than $5000, it was realized that a
very precise procedure would have to be worked out, for diversity of view
in the different departments might lead to confusion in the administration
of the Act. Indeed, the Small Claims Act of 1922, limited to $1ooo, had
produced considerable discord in its interpretation by various depart-
ments. 8 Hence the entrance upon the scene of the Comptroller General
as a unifying authority.
There had been some disposition to limit the authority of the Comp-
troller General in these matters, for he is a fiscal rather than a judicial
officer. At first, he was to have jurisdiction, after a report from the execu-
tive departments concerned, to settle claims up to $2ooo, the main reason
for centralization of authority being the necessity for unifying policy and
procedure. He was also empowered, with the Attorney General, to com-
promise claims above $2ooo, as in the Suits in Admiralty Act of 1925. The
House of Representatives, in its drafts of 1926 and 1928, cut down the
Comptroller's powers materially, by raising executive department juris-
diction to $5o00, without interference by the Comptroller General, ex-
cept to make uniform rules for the department's law officers in administer-
ing the Act. But the Comptroller General was alert to the interests of his
office, for in the 1929 bill, as it finally passed, the Senate not only restored
his lost glory, but increased it by giving him, through the General Ac-
counting Office, exclusive jurisdiction of all claims up to $5o,ooo, with re-
38 See, as to the subrogation policy, the correspondence between the Secretary of War and
the Comptroller General in 193o, Georgetown Law Journal, supra note 5, p. 141 note.
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view on certiorari to the Court of Claims. This went so far as to arouse
the protest of the Attorney General, a fact which presumably induced
President Coolidge to withhold his approval. By the 1929 bill, also, the
proposed jurisdiction of the United States District Courts was elimi-
nated. 9 The fluctuation of policy from preference for the judicial, then for
the administrative and back to the judicial channel-now embodied in the
Howell bill of i932-can thus be observed. In 1929, the Congress pre-
ferred to make the Comptroller and the Court an advisory body for the re-
lief of Senate and House claims committees. By 1932, the Comptroller
having yielded to the objections of the Attorney General with respect to
appearance before the Court of Claims, the nisi prius proceedings were ad-
ministrative, the "appeal" judicial, much as in the case of claims for tax
refunds addressed to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The Small Claims Act of 1922, although purporting to be kept in force
by some of the earlier drafts, is now by implication repealed as inconsistent
with the pending measure.
The Comptroller General in all cases will now make up the record, in the
meantime seeking to settle the claim. Because the Government should
have full opportunity to assemble its evidence in defense, while still ob-
tainable, a very short period (3o days) for filing notice of claim is pro-
vided. The heads of the executive departments and establishments are
required to make prompt investigations of any accident or event in which
their employees are involved, whether or not Government liability is in-
ferable, and to transmit claims, reports, and recommendations for set-
tlement to the Comptroller. Depositions of witnesses may be taken, with
the assistance of the staff of the Department of Justice in the field, and the
Comptroller General may issue subpoenas requiring witnesses to attend
at Washington before an attorney of the Comptroller General acting as a
commissioner-on the model of the Federal Trade Commission-with
power to invoke the aid of the District Courts to require, under threat of
contempt, the production of evidence, written or oral. This confers con-
siderable judicial power on a fiscal officer, but it may be justified by the
necessities of the case and will be likely to be employed advisedly, in the
light of the fact that a dissatisfied claimant can bring an original suit in
the Court of Claims. How much importance will be attributed to the
findings of fact by the Comptroller General is still uncertain. On certiorari
the findings might have been practically conclusive. Possibly on the origi-
'9 On the apparent ground (Sen. Rep. 16og, 7oth Cong., 2d sess.) that "it is not believed
that the procedure of suits against the United States is a proper one to secure judicial determi-
nation of tort claims, especially where there is no controversy as to the liability of the United
States."
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nal suit, the Court of Claims will refer contested issues of fact to one of its
Commissioners. The proceedings in Washington, although confinable to
final argument, may operate to the disadvantage of small claimants living
at a distance from Washington, who may prefer to accept the settlement
offered by the Comptroller rather than incur the expense of a suit in the
national capital. It was this possible hardship which was responsible for
the assignment of jurisdiction to the District Courts in the earlier bills.
Claims for personal injury, which in earlier bills were placed largely un-
der the jurisdiction of the Employees' Compensation Commission, are also,
to be filed now with the Comptroller General, who may enlist the aid of
the Compensation Commission to investigate claims and make recom-
mendations. Negligence of officers or employees and "defect or insuffi-
ciency" of "machinery, vehicle or appliance" are the sources of liability
for personal injury or death.
Contributory negligence is a bar to relief for property and personal in-
jury claims. In earlier bills, the rule of comparative negligence had been
adopted, and in the Howell bill of December 9, 1931, the rule of contribu-
tory negligence was to be limited by the doctrine of "last clear chance."
The Attorney General, however, expressed the opinion that the latter doc-
trine was implicit in the contributory negligence rule, as announced by
the United States Supreme Court,20 and that the explicit mention of the
doctrine in the bill might be construed as extending it beyond the limita-
tions of the Supreme Court to embrace the more liberal view of some of the
state courts. In personal injury and death claims, moreover, intoxication
and wilful misconduct are assimilated to contributory negligence, as are,
to the extent deemed controlling, the aggravation of the injury or pre-
cipitation of the death by unreasonable refusal or failure to submit to or
procure medical or surgical aid, which indeed the Comptroller General
can demand as a condition of pecuniary relief under the bill.
Certain other features of the bill deserve brief mention. If joint liabil-
ity for an injury or loss rests upon some person other than an officer or
employee of the United States, the Government assumes liability only for
its proportionate share.
If the injured person or property was insured, the Comptroller General
and the Court of Claims are directed to deduct the amount of insurance,
collected or collectible, from any award or judgment; and yet, the subro-
gated insurance company has no standing to prosecute its own claim
against the Government. Thus, the Government is likely to escape a great
20 Chunn v. City & Suburban Ry., 207 U.S. 302 (1907). It was suggested that the Comptrol-
ler General and the Court of Claims would of necessity be bound by that decision.
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deal of liability which legally it should assume, as would any other cor-
porate tort-feasor. In the matter of international claims, somewhat dif-
ferent considerations prevail, for there are several reasons why, in addition
to questions of nationality, insurance companies should not be made whole
by the nation and even by foreign nations for risks which they assumed for
profit. In international matters, only the original claimant should be given
a locus standi, subrogation being a matter of private law. In municipal
matters, however, it would not seem improper to ask the Government to
-assume its valid burdens, whether the compensation accrue to an injured
individual or to the insurance company which has already paid the loss.
In case the officer acted wilfully, the Government is empowered to re-
coup its payments under the Act from the wrongdoing officer. Continental
law generally provides for such right of redress, although its pecuniary
value may often not be great. Yet there is administrative value in creating
a more efficient service by enabling the Government to hold officers to per-
sonal responsibility for their wilful acts, by deductions from salary or
other recourse. Perhaps this might be too harsh in the case of uninten-
tional negligence, other administrative sanctions possibly sufficing; for by
the express mention of wilful misconduct, it is assumed that the common
law right of recourse in other cases is not expected to be invoked.
The governmental agencies to which the prospective Act extends are
not only the executive departments and independent establishments, but
all corporations in which the Government owns 51 per cent or more of the
voting shares and "securities." The Panama Railroad is excluded, pre-
sumably because it is already suable in tort.
An effort is made to prevent the Act from becoming a lawyers' bonanza.
Soliciting claims "directly or indirectly" is made a criminal offense, and
attorney's fees, where an award or judgment is obtained, are to be fixed
in each case by the Comptroller General or the Court of Claims, as the
case may be. But whereas all bills prior to the Howell-Collins bill estab-
lished a maximum attorney's allowance of 15 per cent, the last bill, on the
suggestion of the Attorney General, fixed the possible maximum at 25 per
cent, not an ungenerous amount, and higher, I believe, than any foreign
lawyers' tariff admits. The charging or collection of any fee in excess of
the amount allowed by the Comptroller General or the Court of Claims is
made a penal offense.
The presentation of false evidence or the exaggeration of a claim "with
intent to defraud the United States" is a bar to the allowance of any
claim.
Earlier bills had undertaken to make the Tort Claims Act retroactive,
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so as to admit claims which had accrued at a date two or three years prior
to its enactment. The Howell-Collins bill abrogates this feature, a conclu-
sion explainable by the fact that the Government's opportunity to as-
semble evidence in defense, carefully safeguarded by the pending bill,
would probably in old cases have been overlooked or lost. The Act will
hence apply only prospectively. Claims which arose before its enactment
will therefore continue to be presented to the Congress and to be referred
to its Committees on Claims.
These are the outlines of the new system of redistributing the risks of
loss in connection with certain governmental activities. For years an
academic campaign had been waged, designed to emancipate the United
States from a slavish subservience to ancient-and, I think, historically
misunderstood-formulas which had produced manifest injustice in the
name of law and order. The unhappy sufferer was left to bear practically
all the risks of a defective or misdirected operation of the administrative
machine. Realization of this incongruity had produced statutory efforts
at escape; but the old dogmas served unduly to restrict their judicial inter-
pretation and, in the field of municipal government, produced judicial dis-
tinctions which did credit to the courts' desire to reconcile law and justice,
but by their artificiality added, if I may say so, an occasional note of ab-
surdity to the process of judicial exposition.2 In recent years, the climate
of opinion has begun to change, and an increasing number of state statutes
assuming governmental responsibility in tort are receiving the liberal con-
struction intended by the legislatures. Municipal corporation counsel and
states' attorneys, however, still occasionally affect the belief that the as-
sumption of liability is a gratuitous gift, that the legislature could not have
intended what it said, and that the extension of governmental responsibil-
ity is somehow contrary to the public interest. Courts, on the whole, are
taking a more reasonable position.
What is likely to be the practical effect of the Federal Tort Claims Act?
While enlarging the administrative personnel of the Comptroller General's
office and perhaps adding judges and commissioners to the Court of
Claims, it should greatly relieve the congestion in the Claims Committees
and should enable the Congress to devote its exclusive attention to more
important problems. It will substitute judicial methods, with adequate
facilities for investigating and weighing evidence, for political methods,
handicapped by inadequate facilities, in the adjustment of a large group
11 Some of these distinctions, mainly incidental to the effort to distinguish governmental
from corporate functions, are discussed in a series of articles on Government Liability in Tort,
34 Yale L. Jour. 1, 129, 229 (1925).
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of claims, claims which are inseparable from and often unavoidable in the
operation of so vast a machine as the Federal Government. It will pro-
mote popular confidence in the justice of the Government, by no means an
unimportant, even if intangible, factor in public administration. The
cost should not be excessive, and the award of damages will be likely to
be more equitable, as well as legal, than is possible under the present sys-
tem. The example afforded by the Federal Government in publicly recog-
nizing by statute its moral obligation to indemnify those it has unjustly
injured, should serve to stimulate like recognition in the states and cities
of the United States. It is one of the many misfortunes associated with
the passing of Ernst Freund that he did not live to see the fruition of his
scholarly efforts.
